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What does it take to translate research into socially beneﬁcial technologies like vaccines? Current policy
that focuses on expanding research or strengthening incentives overlooks how the supply and demand of
innovation is mediated by problem-solving processes that generate knowledge which is often frag-
mented and only locally valid. This paper details some of the conditions that allow fragmented, local
knowledge to accumulate through a series of structured steps from the artiﬁcial simplicity of the labo-
ratory to the complexity of real world application. Poliomyelitis is used as an illustrative case to highlight
the importance of experimental animal models and the extent of co-ordination that can be required if
they are missing. Implications for the governance and management of current attempts to produce
vaccines for HIV, TB and Malaria are discussed.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
How is knowledge accumulated to generate socially beneﬁcial
technology? Vaccines, as a case in point, have arguably prevented
more premature deaths, disability and suffering than any other
medical intervention (Andre et al., 2008). However, vaccines are
difﬁcult to develop and can cost $600 me$1 bn to bring to market
(Douglas, 2004; NIH & NIAID, 2007; Plotkin, 2005). Even with
investment, success is not guaranteed. HIV vaccine R&D increased
to $961 m in 2007, but most vaccinologists do not expect a vaccine
in the next decade (Connor & Green, 2008). Other vaccines have
eluded discovery for over a century despite investment (IAVI, 2008:
14), creating policy concerns about the rate of innovation.
Suggestions for ways to improve vaccine innovation have typi-
cally focused on upstream funding or downstream product accep-
tance. Advocates of increased research funding (Archibugi & Bizzarri,
2004) do not explain why poorly funded programmes can succeed
while well funded programmes sometimes fail. Economists often
assume demand constrains supply (Esparza et al., 2003; Pauly et al.,
1995) and propose advanced market commitments (Kremer et al.,
2006), intellectual property incentives (Lanjouw, 2003), and
PublicePrivate Partnerships (PPPs) (Buse & Waxman, 2001) as
solutions. Sociologists, by contrast, focus on anti-vaccination, P.Nightingale@sussex.ac.uk,
All rights reserved.
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12), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016movements (Blume, 2006), resistance to vaccine uptake (Blume,
2006; Mays et al., 2004; Nichter, 1995; Poltorak et al., 2005), the
efﬁcacy of promotion strategies (Blume & Tump, 2010; Pérez-Cuevas
et al. 1999), delivery and access (Aston, 2001; IOM, 2003), industry
norms (Blume, 1998), and social selection (Blume & Zanders, 2006).
Again, these explanations are all relatively silent onwhy vaccine
innovation is so difﬁcult. HIV vaccine research, for example, is well
funded, has a lucrative market and is supported by a powerful
coalition, yet vaccines are not forthcoming. Suggesting that some
problems are simply ‘more difﬁcult’ is unhelpful as it closes off
analysis and suggests nothing can be done. In this paper we explore
what makes innovation more or less difﬁcult, as there is good
reason to think ‘difﬁculty’ is not ﬁxed. Innovations emerge from
uncertain, path-dependent, socially distributed problem-solving
processes (Dosi, 1982), so changing the processes can sometimes
make previously intractable technical problems solvable. Hence,
the pre-launch aspects of medical innovation are not just ‘technical’
problems addressed by scientists, and involve social questions
about the relative costs of vaccines, or their implications for
existing immunisation schedules, for example, that inﬂuence the
cost, time and effectiveness of the process.
To explore if and how the difﬁculty of vaccine innovation can be
changed, the Section 2 develops new theory to understand what
inﬂuences the greater number of experimental cycles associated
with ‘more difﬁcult’ medical innovations. This suggests problem-
solving is structured by, and moves across, a series of ‘interme-
diate conditions’ from the artiﬁcially simpliﬁed (and therefore
unrealistic, low cost and low risk) experimental conditions thatnovation, translational research and the management of knowledge
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cost, and higher risk) conditions most relevant to practice. Under-
standing gained from simpliﬁed stages guides the design of
increasingly realistic prototypes as the simplifying conditions are
relaxed. As a result, the knowledge being generated undergoes
qualitative changes as experiments’ protection from social, regu-
latory, ethical and economic inﬂuences is removed. The seemingly
purely technical, asocial nature of experiments is therefore the
consequence of human action and not a reﬂection of its absence.
This implies that the difﬁculty of innovation is inﬂuenced by
researchers’ ability to build manageable intermediate stages, as
large jumps compromise experimental learning. This ability can be
constrained by both biology and the social processes used to
manage research. These points are illustrated in Section 3 by an
historical review of poliomyelitis vaccine development. Section 4
discusses implications.
Experimental knowledge accumulation
The term “translational research” can be potentially misleading
as the relationship between scientiﬁc research and innovation is
more complex than the linear application of research it implies
(Blume, 1998; Marincola, 2003). Technologies sometimes precede
the scientiﬁc theories that explain why they work. Steam engines,
planes and transistors, for example, existed before thermody-
namics, aerodynamics or solid state physics were well developed
(see Nelson et al., 2011 for medical examples). This is possible
because technologies emerge from the ‘operational principles’ that
deﬁne how they work (Vincenti, 1990: 209) which do not need
a basis in science. It is possible, after all, to know how to produce an
effect without knowing how an effect is produced.
Because these operational principles have the form ‘phenomena
x can be generated using y’, they generate more speciﬁc sub-
problems (i.e. how to produce y) that iterate to produce a hier-
archy of increasingly speciﬁc, inter-related problem-solving tasks
(Constant, 1980: 24e27; Vincenti, 1990: 9). These tasks form the
basis for an innovation process that will typically involve the costly
and time-consuming exploration of various dead-ends to discover
which uncertain operational principles work.
Since theory is a weak guide to practice, even after operational
principles are discovered considerable operating experience may
be needed to reliably understand their behaviour. Unfortunately,
malfunctioning technology can be harmful and post-launch testing
and modiﬁcations can be difﬁcult and expensive (Nelson et al.,
2011). It is therefore often desirable to know how a technology
will work before it is launched, which requires considerable testing
to identify, ﬁne-tune and ensure the safety of different options
(Constant, 1980). This is why many medical technologies undergo
formal, regulated pre-launch testing.
An inﬁnite number of possible explanations exist for any
experimental results that occur during this testing, which might
suggest learning is impossible. However, only a ﬁnite number of
explanations are actually at hand, and scientiﬁc understanding can
guide problem-solving by providing a context for interpreting
results that helps researchers select a smaller sub-set that are
reasonable to pursue. This helps reduce the number of dead-ends
that are explored. Experiments can reduce the set of explanations
further by creating puriﬁed conditions where only a subpopulation
of competing explanations’ assumptions hold (e.g. constant
temperature, no light or oxygen, etc.). Experimenters intervene
(Hacking, 1983) with instruments through varied, measured and
controlled manipulation of experimental conditions (Nelson, 2008)
to isolate and test speciﬁc mechanisms so the divergent implica-
tions of competing explanations can be compared, and effective
operational principles discovered (Nightingale, 2004).Please cite this article in press as: Yaqub, O., & Nightingale, P., Vaccine in
accumulation, Social Science & Medicine (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016Innovation can therefore be constrained if the number of
possible explanations is too large, at a given level of understanding,
to select from at reasonable cost, and simpliﬁed experimental
conditions are too unrealistic to usefully learn from. This can be
addressed by initially building up understanding from simpliﬁed
models and then gradually relaxing simplifying assumptions to
make experiments more realistic. This generates a series of exper-
imental stepping stones in the path from laboratory experiments to
working products. Biologists use a number of standardised ‘model
organisms’ from yeast, through nematode worms, to zebra ﬁsh,
mice and monkeys, before human trials that allow them to select
settings that trade-off ease of learning (simplicity) against clinical
relevance (complexity). This is why animal models are so central to
medical research (see Leydesdorff et al., in preparation, Fig. 1).
When using these models two styles of testing are used. Passive
‘testing as validation’ involves testing whether similar problems
have similar solutions (Nightingale, 2004). This can be largely a-
theoretical because it is not necessary to know how a technology
works in order to know that it does work. However, it offers little
guidance about what to do if tests fail. In such cases, rather than
a cycle of conjecture and refutation, active ‘testing as experimental
intervention’ is used to build artiﬁcial experimental conditions that
create phenomena to allow theoretical learning (Hacking, 1983).
The photoelectric, Zeeman, Compton, and Josephson effects in
physics, for example, came into being through human ingenuity to
support theoretical learning (Hacking, 1983).
Since new phenomena are being created in these experimental
settings, variations in local experimental practice, instruments, and
protocols can make comparison difﬁcult. Comparing two different
vaccines using virus types of varying pathogenicity, administered
by different routes of infection, in different amounts, using different
animal models and end points, might be meaningless (Yaqub,
2008). This is a particular problem with biomedical research
where scientiﬁc knowledge often has only local application
because, unlike the puriﬁed settings of a physics experiment, in
biological settings multiple ‘laws of nature’ interact in complex,
non-linear ways (West & Nightingale, 2009). The knowledge that is
produced can therefore be speciﬁc to the experimental conditions,
so that experimental reproduction requires considerable ‘tinkering’
and tacit knowledge (Baird, 2004; Fleck, 1981; Fujimura, 1992). This
makes the co-ordination of the distributed research groups
working on complex technologies difﬁcult, so that bio-scientiﬁc
advances can take decades to reach clinical application (Hopkins
et al., 2007).
Because knowledge may not necessarily integrate readily,
testing often requires standardisation, management, and co-
ordination to create comparability between experiments and
ensure fragmented knowledge accumulates through the stages and
cross-sectionally across different groups working in parallel. Hence
the difﬁculty of innovation isn’t ﬁxed and can be reduced if effective
research governance can reduce the number of costly and time
consuming experimental cycles that are required to generate a safe
and effective product. When this co-ordination is not in place
knowledge accumulation can be constrained, even if additional
research funding is provided or demand is increased.
Research design
To illustrate the importance of an effective testing regime for
vaccine innovation, we use a deviant (or extreme outlier) counter-
theoretical case where a key element in the theory is missing. The
theory suggests that innovation moves across a series of stepping
stones, and we explore a situation where early stepping stones are
missing (because the virus does not infect small mammals). We
infer about their importance from the extensive governancenovation, translational research and the management of knowledge
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(Gerschenkron, 1962: 359). To increase within-case validity we use
three internal cases and discuss between-case validity in relation to
malaria, tuberculosis and HIV (where animal models are also
missing) in the conclusion.
The data and analysis are structured based on Blume’s (1992)
‘career’ framework (Hopkins, 2004) that links to research on clin-
ical trials, community dialogue (Bastien, 1995), immunisation
schedules, health systems (Bonu et al., 2003), and funding and
production mechanisms (Bryder, 1999). Our data draws on a range
of historical sources, including practitioners’ accounts, scientiﬁc
reviews and journals, histories, biographies, policy reports, news-
paper articles, and publications by NGOs such as advocacy groups,
charities and foundations. This research was subject to the
University of Sussex’s ethical review.
The path to poliomyelitis vaccines
Vaccine innovation starts with diagnosis, whereby previously
unrelated symptoms are grouped as a disease, around a disease-
causing pathogen (Rosenberg, 2002). Understanding disease
mechanisms (pathogenesis) clariﬁes the problem, helps both deﬁne
the operational principles needed to address the disease, and
generate the collective vision and shared expectations which
mobilise social, ﬁnancial and political resources within networks as
‘opportunities presented as promises, get accepted and become
part of an agenda; and are subsequently converted into require-
ments that guide search processes’ (Blume,1992: 64e70; van Lente,
1993: 198).
With poliomyelitis this occurred in the middle of the 19th
century after physicians associated paralysis with inﬂammation
(itis) of the grey (polios) matter of the spinal cord (myelos) of chil-
dren. Initially, associated with teething, the clustering of cases in
households suggested an infectious disease (Carter, 1965: 8). This
was shown in 1908 when Landsteiner and Popper infected
monkeys by inoculating their brains with infected human spinal
cord tissue (Robbins, 2004: 17). The following year, Flexner and
Lewis passed the infection between monkeys (Carter, 1965: 9)
starting the search for the infectious agent (Mullan, 1989: 100).
Since infectious disease agents can be poisoned (with drugs) or
killed by an immune system (primed by vaccines) this diagnosis
added a new potential option for treatment to public health strat-
egies, which moved away from environmental improvement and
quarantine towards prophylactic vaccine development (Baldwin,
1999; Hortsmann, 1985; Tomes, 1990). However, the exact opera-
tional principle remained unclear without further investigation of
poliovirus’ epidemiology.
By 1910 it was demonstrated that monkeys surviving poliomy-
elitis resisted re-infection and their blood contained a substance that
neutralised the virus (Paul, 1971: 108). Since vaccines’ operational
principles are conditional on infection conferring immunity, this was
a major ‘proof of concept’ ﬁnding. As a result, in 1911 Flexner issued
a press release predicting a remedy within six months (Paul, 1971:
116; 125). However, several obstacles remained. Laboratory diag-
nosis was dependent on testing spinal ﬂuid, obtained through
a specialised, painful and dangerous procedure, with the result that
serum was scarce and unreliable (Rogers, 1992). Vaccines’ opera-
tional principles depend on safely stimulating an immune response
by manipulating and developing the virus to limit pathogenic
(disease causing) qualities, while accentuating immunogenic
(immune-response stimulation) qualities. In general, the more
pathogen there is, the larger number of substances and techniques
that alter the pathogen can be explored to determine whether the
changes produce a ‘safe’ and ‘appropriate’ response. It was quickly
recognised that the lack of sufﬁcient wild-type virus wasPlease cite this article in press as: Yaqub, O., & Nightingale, P., Vaccine in
accumulation, Social Science & Medicine (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016a signiﬁcant barrier to understanding poliomyelitis pathogenesis
and developing a vaccine (Robbins, 2004: 17).
It is now known that three types of poliovirus can enter the
mouth and nose in saliva droplets or microscopic faeces and then
reproduce in the gut. Normally the immune system limits infection,
but in 1e2% of cases the virus travels through the blood into the
central nervous system, causingmeningitis and paralysis (Racaniello,
2006). The model postulated by Flexner in 1913 was different
(Rogers, 1992) and suggested poliomyelitis travelled through the
sinuses to the brain and spine, and grew in nervous tissue. These
assumptions led researchers down three dead ends. First, they tried
to culture the virus in nervous tissue. Second, they reasoned that
vaccines would not work because poliovirus did not enter the
bloodstream. Third, they were unaware they were dealing with
multiple types of virus, whichmade comparing experimental results
across and within laboratories difﬁcult. As a result, the consensus of
the scientiﬁc community from 1913 till 1935 was that a vaccine was
possible but unlikely (Carter, 1965: 58; Paul, 1971: 113).
By 1916, the annual incidence of paralytic poliomyelitis in the US
was over 27,000, killing more than 7000. Reported cases had never
exceeded 7.9 per 100,000 before, but in 1916 the rate jumped to
28.5 per 100,000 (Paul, 1971: 148; Rogers, 1992: 10). Hospitals
refused to admit new cases, cities began insect control programmes
and impounded cats and dogs (Paul, 1971: 291) and parents sealed
windows and refused to let children play outside (Oshinsky, 2005).
When Franklin Roosevelt was struck by poliomyelitis in 1921, his
carefully handled public relations altered perceptions of disability
and helped structure networks of resources for scientiﬁc research
(Gallagher, 1985; Oshinsky, 2005). When it was reported in 1924
that he bathed in Warm Springs Georgia, other sufferers followed.
Roosevelt then spent two thirds of his personal fortune turning it
into the Warm Springs Foundation under the direction of his
former law partner, Basil O’Connor, whose daughter later died from
poliomyelitis (Oshinsky, 2005).
In 1934 Roosevelt staged nationwide charity balls ‘to dance so
others may walk’ (Carter, 1965: 14) to relieve Warm Springs’ debts
(Rose, 2003). Despite the stock market crash the campaign raised
$1 m that year, $0.75 m the next, and reserved $100,000 to ‘stim-
ulate and further the meritorious work being done in the ﬁeld of
infantile paralysis’ (Carter, 1965: 14e18). The ﬁrst sixteen research
grants totalled $250,000, one of which, for $65,000, was distributed
to Maurice Brodie (Benison, 1967: 179).
BrodieeKolmer vaccine failures
The optimism of the time was based on the successes of tetanus
and diphtheria vaccines, which had saved millions of lives by 1910
(Chase, 1982: 302). They were based on passive immunisation,
using sera drawn from the blood of immunised horses. Flexner and
Lewis attempted to replicate this approach but reported ‘failure to
produce neutralising serum in the horse. [it] displayed no power
whatever to inhibit the action of the virus’ (Chase, 1982). Poliovirus
could not be grown in horses, or any other non-primate. Further
research therefore required either humans or monkeys e ‘cranky,
expensive creatures, which (prior to antibiotics) had a way of suc-
cumbing to other diseases before the researcher could measure its
responses to poliomyelitis. No laboratory combined sufﬁcient
interest with enough funds to maintain all the monkeys needed for
thorough study of poliovirus’ (Carter, 1965: 19).
Had it been possible to infect mice or rats, they could be used as
cheap, fast and simple animal models to generate experimental
data on infection (Nightingale, 2000). Since this was not possible
innovation took a path of ‘testing as validation’. In 1936, two rival
investigators independently conducted ﬁeld trials of vaccines
(Chase, 1982; Robbins, 2004). Brodie and Park used a formalin-novation, translational research and the management of knowledge
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a killed virus approach), whilst Kolmer used ‘a veritable witches’
brew’ (Paul, 1971: 258) of live virus made from spinal cords treated
with chemicals and refrigeration. The two teams hurried their
vaccines into trials. Many of the 12,000 children Kolmer vaccinated
were killed or paralysed, which sparked a two decades ‘wave of
revulsion against human vaccination’ (Paul, 1971: 260).
The trials were indicative of the community’s testing norms
(Constant, 1980: 8). Vaccinology was seen as an empirical science
that did not require knowledge of how a vaccine worked. Smallpox
and rabies vaccines had been developed without formal identiﬁ-
cation of their infectious agents. This approach works if new
vaccines follow the same operational principles and pass validation
tests. But failures provide no additional insight. As the theory
section highlighted this requires a different style of testing and
a more sophisticated testing regime.
In hindsight, testing in this case was impeded in three ways.
First, feedback loops in learning cycles were weak because so little
virus was available. Few researchers could diagnose infection
quickly by extracting spinal ﬂuid, so most researchers had to wait
for symptoms when testing for any immunity. Second, experi-
mental iterations and reﬁnements could not be made cheaply,
easily, or quickly because of the lack of a simple model. Monkeys
are difﬁcult, slow and expensive to work with. Brodie only tested
his vaccine on 20 monkeys before testing 300 children whilst
Kolmer tested a few monkeys, himself, his children and 22 others
before distributing his vaccine (Paul, 1971). Thirdly, the community
did not establish the types of poliomyelitis virus they wereworking
with before trialling. Each issue needed to be addressed.
The failures moved Roosevelt to abandon the Birthdays Balls
after 1937 and rename the Warm Springs Foundation the National
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (Rose, 2003). Its mission was to
‘ensure that every possible research agency in the country is
adequately ﬁnanced to carry out investigations into the cause of
infantile paralysis and the methods by which it may be prevented’
(Carter, 1965: 15). Signiﬁcantly, it would also ‘lead, direct, and unify
the ﬁght of every phase of this sickness’ (Markel, 2005: 1408).
Radio promotion raised over $1.8 m in a week, with proceeds
increasing so that by 1945 receipts totalled $18 m, and by 1955
$67 m (Carter, 1965: 26). Between 1938 and 1962, the Foundation’s
overall incomewas $630mwith $69m spent on vaccine R&D (Paul,
1971: 312). In 1947, Harry Weaver was appointed as Director of
Research to manage the research effort. He invited leading
researchers to conferences, published proceedings (Smith, 1990)
and instituted round table discussions to ‘encourage communica-
tion and intellectual cross-fertilisation in a ﬁeld notable for its lack
of both’ (Carter, 1965: 57). These ledWeaver to the view that whilst
undirected researchers establish more certainties about a disease,
they often investigated questions of little technological relevance.
He wrote to O’Connor:
“Only an appalling few.were really trying to solve the problem
of poliomyelitis..If real progress were to be made, more exact
methods of research would have to be clearly deﬁned, proce-
dures and techniques would have to be developed. individual
groups would have to sacriﬁce . their inherent right to roam
the ﬁeld, and concentrate their energies on one, or atmost, a few
objectives” (Carter, 1965: 57).
Previously the Foundation funded investigator-initiated projects
(Benison, 1967; Smith, 1990), but Weaver set up a Scientiﬁc
Research Committee to more carefully direct and co-ordinate
research. Its head, Dr. Thomas Rivers, noted:
“ . the Scientiﬁc Research Committee received any number of
applications from individual investigators and, whilemanywerePlease cite this article in press as: Yaqub, O., & Nightingale, P., Vaccine in
accumulation, Social Science & Medicine (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016worthwhile in themselves, together they did not seem to be
going anywhere. They were too haphazard for a program and I
thought that the Foundation would be better served if
a committee surveyed the ﬁeld and blocked out problems that
needed solution. the committee should seek out the men and
institutions capable of researching such problems and support
them” (Benison, 1967: 231).
Despite resistance, Rivers and Weaver directed an 11 point
research plan that tackled the three impediments to vaccine
development directly (Benison, 1967: 229). After Weaver com-
plained that experiments were ‘botched by scientists who used too
fewmonkeys or made the error of reusing monkeys whose systems
were misleadingly immune to another type of the virus’ O’Connor
resolved to ‘go into the monkey business’ (Carter, 1965: 73).
Establishing Okatie farms
As noted previously, after decades of trying, researchers had not
infected small, inexpensive laboratory animals. Since economies of
scale in experimentation, unlike production, typically depend on
reductions in size (Nightingale, 2000) this substantially constrained
research. While monkeys could be infected they required speci-
alised care and quarters (Paul, 1971: 101). Researchers had to spend
signiﬁcant proportions of their time arranging their housing and
feeding, and ‘placating the assistants who had to work with them’
(Smith, 1990: 123). Skilled technicians were needed to clean, feed,
look after, and handle the monkeys whilst contending with the risk
of bites, thumps and disease.
Despite these difﬁculties, demand outstripped supply as
capturing wild monkeys was difﬁcult. Cynomolgous monkeys
provided good disease models and were easier to work with, but
they were scarce and expensive to import from the Philippines and
Indonesia (Smith, 1990; Time, 1954). Rhesus monkeys were more
abundant in India, but are sacred to Hindus. Researchers com-
plained that their monkeys arrived dead or diseased (see Salk’s
correspondence in Carter, 1965: 75).
To address these problems O’Connor established Okatie Farms
while Weaver organised monkey ‘airlifts’ from India and Indonesia
(Time, 1954: 7). At the Farms monkeys recuperated before being
dispatched to laboratories, saving laboratory time, effort and space.
Smith (1990: 121) describes the Farms as ‘a rehabilitation facility
that was also a centre for research in the solution of problems
nobody else much cared about.’ The Farms developed carefully
formulated dry monkey-feed (Carter, 1965: 76) and provided
instructions on feeding (Smith, 1990: 122). The historical record
contains long correspondences regarding the minutiae of deliv-
ering, feeding, handling and disposing of monkeys (Carter, 1965).
This ‘monkey business’ substantially lowered the costs, improved
the quality and raised the comparability of experimentation. Once
the monkeys were in place the next barrier could be addressed.
Tissue culturing
The effort to develop better methods for propagating the virus
continued unsuccessfully throughout the 1930s (Robbins, 2004). By
1940 two groups grew poliovirus in human embryonic brain tissue,
but did not extend the technique to non-nervous system tissues
(Burnet & Jackson, 1940; Sabin & Olitsky, 1936). Robbins (2004)
suggests this delayed the vaccine by almost a decade.
This reﬂected the orthodoxy that poliovirus was a nervous
system virus, which occasionally spilled over into the blood.
Unfortunately the ﬁnding that the virus could grow in brain tissue
only reinforced the notion that poliovirus was neurotropic. It was
therefore thought that a vaccine was dangerously impracticalnovation, translational research and the management of knowledge
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during preparation, raising the risk of fatal encephalitis (Rogers,
1992).
However, Paul and Trask discovered the virus in human faeces,
implying it could reproduce in the alimentary tract (Paul, 1971:
281). In 1940, Bodian and Howe infected chimpanzees by feeding
them and in 1947 Melnick and Hortsmann demonstrated the
animals’ resistance to re-infection (Paul, 1971: 287), strongly indi-
cating an intestinal infection.
The Foundation commissioned several groups working on
culturing techniques and supplied them with poliovirus and
funding (Carter, 1965: 60; Chase, 1982: 292). The Foundation also
helped source embryonic tissue from local maternity hospitals and
proactively dealt with the qualitatively different social concerns
that arose from experiments with human tissues derived from the
foreskins of newborn boys, placentas, miscarriages and still-born
tissue (Smith, 1990). A major breakthrough came when Enders,
Weller and Robbins succeeded in cultivating poliovirus in human
non-nervous tissues (embryonic skin muscle). Soon poliomyelitis
was propagated in variety of tissues (Robbins, 2004: 18).
While initially underappreciated (Paul, 1971: 373), tissue culture
transformed testing by providing a safer and simpler experimental
environment, tighter feedback loops and faster testing cycles, so
that experimental knowledge could accumulate faster. It drastically
reduced the need to import monkeys which savedmoney and time.
As Chase (1982: 286) notes ‘worse than the costs of buying and
maintaining these animals were the temporal limits they placed on
the investigative progress’. With the need for experimental animals
vastly reduced, more ideas could be tested, costs reduced, feedback
loops shortened, and results could be assessed more quickly
(Nightingale, 2000).
Tissue culturing also provided better quality virus that was
relatively free of protein and, crucially, free of encephalitis causing
nerve cells (Robbins, 2004: 18). This reopened a previously closed
operational principle. The Foundation exploited the breakthrough
by educating specialists and training technicians so the technique
would diffuse quickly, and continue to be developed (Carter, 1965:
26). This ‘tinkering’ knowledge is important because to achieve
good yields, cultures have to be kept at precise temperatures, in
very clean containers, of the right shape and size, with the right
kind of lids and stoppers (Smith, 1990). The technique was
improved in 1953, when human embryonic tissue was substituted
with the testicles or kidneys of monkeys generating a substantial
economy of scale. A single testicle or kidney could provide enough
tissue culture for two hundred test tubes when the previous
method generated enough for one (Carter, 1965: 114).
Finally, tissue cultures could be used to establish shared stan-
dards. Since infected cells were rapidly destroyed (Chase, 1982:
292; Robbins, 2004: 19) the cytopathic effect could indicate viral
replication and the presence of viruses. With some technical
modiﬁcations, tissue cultures were also used for virus titration,
antibody quantiﬁcation, virus isolation from clinical specimens and
antigenic typing of virus isolates (Robbins, 2004: 19).
These improvements allowed research groups to compare their
results, which then revealed new paradoxes as similar experiments
were producing different results. As Robbins (2004: 18) reﬂects,
small differences in how long or how often nutrient media were
changed were enough to produce opposite results. Rivers sought to
ﬁnd ﬂaws in earlier research to explain the different results (Carter,
1965: 90) but realised that different research groups were using
different viruses. Sabin and Olitsky experiments had failed because
their MV virus was the only poliovirus that would not grow in non-
nervous tissue. Rivers noted if they ‘had worked with another
strain. the chances are that.wewould have had a breakthrough ’
much earlier (Carter, 1965: 91). Working without a clear cataloguePlease cite this article in press as: Yaqub, O., & Nightingale, P., Vaccine in
accumulation, Social Science & Medicine (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016of the various poliomyelitis strains had impeded vaccine develop-
ment because the scientiﬁc facts that were establishedwere local to
particular virus types which made comparisons difﬁcult.
Virus typing: a ‘dull and menial’ program
In 1948, Weaver pushed virus typing as an important, but
theoretically unexciting, strategic research project. For a long time
it was suspected that multiple strains of poliovirus existed but to
establish this would involve a longer systematic effort that would
involve substantial investments in laboratory space, monkeys,
technical personnel, and equipment. Much like the Human Genome
Project senior researchers were reluctant to take on the ‘drudgery’
of several years of mechanical and boring work (Carter, 1965: 61).
Immunological testing was difﬁcult, imprecise and time
consuming. A group of monkeys was infected with a strain of
poliovirus, say Type I virus, and allowed to recover. If they got sick
when challenged with ‘standard’ doses of an unknown virus, one
infers a new strain, say Type II, is present. This strain can then be
injected into another group of monkeys that have recovered from
Type II virus infection. If they remain healthy, the unknown strain
can be conﬁrmed as Type II. If they get sick the procedure is
repeated.
Thewhole protocol, evenwhen executed perfectly andwith a lot
of luck, would have required many monkeys. But there are many
inaccuracies in making the deductions. Preparing ‘standard’ chal-
lenge stocks is a delicate, time consuming and frustrating job
because viruses differed in their pathogenicity and infectivity. As
a result, the standard dose was different for each virus strain and
could be miscalculated easily. When challenge stocks are too weak,
very mild infection can be mistaken for prior immunity. When they
are too strong the monkeys end up dead. To guard against such
miscalculations, each step of the process needed to be repeated
with dozens of monkey groups (Smith, 1990). Only then can
a public challenge-stock database be compiled and shared.
Weaver initially set up an eminent advisory committee to lead
the project but they were uninspired. Jonas Salk, who was to
develop a working vaccine, had just set up a new laboratory of his
own after having worked on a formalin-inactivated inﬂuenza
vaccine with his mentor, Thomas Francis, for the US Armed Forces
(Carter, 1965: 35; Galambos & Sewell, 1995: 47). Salk was looking
for his laboratory’s ﬁrst grant when he was encouraged to take on
thework being offered by the Foundation (Carter, 1965). It was seen
by Salk as ‘a dull but dependable investment that would provide
a regular dividend of money’ (Smith, 1990: 110e117).
The large scale experiment spanned four universities and two
years, acquired and classiﬁed over 200 clinical strains of poliovirus,
cost $1.37 m and used 30,000 monkeys imported at great expense
(Chase, 1982). To put this in perspective, only 17,500 monkeys had
been used in all previous experiments (Carter, 1965; Chase, 1982)
and in 2002 only 52,000 non-human primates were used across the
entire US R&D system (USDA, 2002). The project showed conclu-
sively that there were three, and only three, immunologically
distinct types of poliomyelitis virus (Bodian, 1949; Time,1953). This
crucial information provided a standard against which future
vaccine candidates could be compared (Carter, 1965: 275). The
Foundation then funded expensive epidemiological studies to
establish where the three strains were prevalent, which informed
decisions about the location of future ﬁeld trials.
Discussion and conclusion
This history of poliomyelitis vaccine development has hopefully
shown the difﬁculty of medical innovation isn’t necessarily ﬁxed.
Pre-launch, technical features of vaccine development can benovation, translational research and the management of knowledge
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a series of stages from the protected, simpliﬁed, low cost and low
risk conditions of the laboratory, to the social complexity of a high
risk and high cost vaccination programme.
After the initial problematisation and diagnosis of poliomyelitis,
simple extrapolation of an older operational principle produced
disastrous results, and shifted the research agenda towards a new
approach based on understanding disease pathology. As with many
medical technologies, human safety concerns were paramount and
shaped how this approach was undertaken. The absence of an
animal model made experimentation more costly, time consuming
and difﬁcult. As a result, extensive research governance was
required to substitute for the missing animal models. These inter-
ventions included: the provision of monkeys to reduce the costs of
experiments; the development of tissue culture techniques (to
provide more consistent experimental inputs, with faster, tighter
and better deﬁned experimental cycles); and the establishment of
an expensive virus typing programme to clarify a scientiﬁcally dull
but technically important question.
Once this was done, the ﬁnal ‘stepping stones’ involved
discovering howmuch antibody stimulationwas needed to acquire
immunity (Yaqub, 2008) and then testing in humans. Three kinds of
vaccine went through clinical trials, each based on a different
operational principle: passive antibody immunisation, and killed
and live poliovirus immunisation. They yielded a killed vaccine in
1955 (Markel, 2005), and a live vaccine shortly afterwards (Robbins,
2004) which have succeeded in bringing poliomyelitis close to
eradication (Blume, 2005). The subsequent development of
genetically modiﬁed animal models has made their improvement
much easier (Ren et al., 1990).
The theory behind this history suggests that medical innovation
is likely to be constrained in similar ‘difﬁcult’ experimental situa-
tions where there are gaps between experimental stages. Under
such conditions, research may need more active management to
ensure knowledge can be shared, generalised and accumulated.
However, care must be takenwhen generalising from this history as
it occurred just after Enders’ breakthrough in tissue culturing,
when extra co-ordination would be particularly valuable.
All the same, the lessons it offers may have relevance today
because three major diseases e HIV, tuberculosis and malaria e also
have missing intermediate stages and further complicating factors
(see Table 1).Withmost vaccines, either the disease is safe enough toTable 1
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Limited (Weiss, 2003) Extreme (Garber et al
Please cite this article in press as: Yaqub, O., & Nightingale, P., Vaccine in
accumulation, Social Science & Medicine (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016allow volunteers to be used if no animal models exist (e.g., measles,
mumps, rubella, human adenovirus and varicella), or the disease is
fatal and an animal model exists (e.g., hepatitis A and B). For polio-
myelitis, HIV and malaria, and to a lesser extent tuberculosis, the
disease is fatal and animal models are problematic.
Vaccine development is further complicated because there is no
natural sterilising immunity for these diseases. Since the body does
not clear these pathogens, the normal operational principle of
generating sterilising immunity without causing disease is not
available, and a different operational principle is needed. Further-
more, these pathogens show either high or extreme genetic vari-
ation (HIV infection can quickly generate many quasi-species
within a single individual). This means that vaccines have to work
quickly (perhaps within hours of infection) to effectively neutralise
all variants. Moreover, it closes off the use of attenuated live
vaccines that might mutate back into a deadly form.
Given these additional complications, the lack of early stage
animal models would be expected to substantially hamper
knowledge accumulation, which makes their innovation processes
qualitatively more difﬁcult by substantially increasing the number
of ‘redesign cycles’ that must be explored. This suggests that our
expectations about how easy it will be to produce a vaccine should
be tempered, or our efforts increased, or both. Moreover, it helps
explain the high proﬁle failures in HIV vaccine innovation, thus far,
the long time it is taking to generate a Malaria vaccine, and why no
new TB vaccines have been successful since BCG was introduced in
the 1920s, despite BCG’s limited effectiveness.
The key argument of this paper is more positive: while these
biological features of vaccine development change the number of
redesign cycles and dead-ends that are explored, they do not ﬁx
them. Improved research governance and management have the
potential to reduce them. However, it is unclear if recent changes
will improve this co-ordination. The biggest recent change has been
the rise of global, disease-speciﬁc Public Private Partnerships
(PPPs), such as the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) and
the Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI). Whilst these organisations
have played important roles in increasing funding (McCoy et al.,
2009), many are based on a social venture capital model which,
like commercial venture capital, works best after the knowledge
accumulation problems highlighted in this paper have been solved.
Few PPPs have the Foundation’s ability to direct research, andwhile
private sector actors brings beneﬁts, their increased use ofTB Malaria
ssion by virus hidden
by free virus.
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novation, translational research and the management of knowledge
/j.socscimed.2012.07.023
O. Yaqub, P. Nightingale / Social Science & Medicine xxx (2012) 1e8 7intellectual property protection may make co-ordination more
difﬁcult. Unsurprisingly, PPPs tend to be better at co-ordinating the
later stages of vaccine innovation than early stage knowledge
accumulation (Chataway et al., 2010). Whether strengthening
intellectual property regimes - which inﬂuence the costs and trade-
offs involved in co-ordination- constrains or encourages innovation
is currently the subject of substantial debate. Future researchmight
usefully explore how these changes inﬂuence the problems of
knowledge accumulation highlighted in this paper.
In conclusion, the limited production of new vaccines does not
necessarily indicate a lack of social concern, demand or funding. It
also reﬂects a difference in difﬁculty of such a degree that some
therapeutics and prophylactics may be beyond easy reach. Calls for
more funding are likely to ﬁnd backing from the analysis of this
paper, but that backing is nuanced. Simply funding science without
any governance in these situations may not generate solutions.
Similarly, demand-side measures like competitions, prizes and
purchase commitments, may not be successful if they are based on
an assumption that the co-ordination of translational research is
straightforward.
There are clearly trade-offs with the governance of research.
Under conditions of uncertainty, decentralised exploration of
multiple avenues has advantages in terms of search, but disad-
vantages in terms of co-ordination. Even with the beneﬁt of hind-
sight, it is not clear which patterns of governance would be most
appropriate for improving the co-ordination of translational
research. Our current theoretical understanding focuses on the two
extremes of decentralised markets and topedown, centralised
control, but the implications of this paper suggest more attention is
needed between these extremes to understand how the difﬁculty
of seemingly intractable problems can be reduced by human
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